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RICHARD BRIFFAULTt
Our existing federal campaign finance system-the product of
Watergate Era legislation' and the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in
Buckley v. Valeo-is in a state of disarray. The system is no longer ca-
pable of accomplishing the goals pursued by Congress and embraced
by the Court a quarter-century ago: full disclosure of the sources of
campaign money; limitations on large contributions by individuals;
prohibitions on the use of corporate and union treasury funds; and
voluntary, partial public funding, with spending limits, in the Presi-
dential election. Indeed, the current law may actually have negative
consequences, with unindexed contribution limits encouraging eva-
sion, driving up the burdens of fundraising, providing a major role for
organized interest groups and bundlers, and placing a premium on
the personal wealth of candidates.
More fundamentally, our system fails to take seriously the con-
cerns that ought to be central to the campaign finance system of a
democratic society. These include: (i) fair and vigorous competition
among candidates; (ii) equality of voter influence on electoral out-
comes; and (iii) recognition that the campaign finance system can af-
fect the integrity of the political process. Instead, many of our elec-
tions are uncompetitive, with one candidate-typically the
incumbent-wildly outspending the others. A tiny number of very
wealthy individuals have enormous influence over the financing of
f Vice Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law.
' SeeFederal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994); Presiden-
tial Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9012 (1994); Presidential Primary Matching
Payment AccountAct, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042 (1994).
' 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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election campaigns, and, ultimately, on the elections themselves.
Large campaign donations and candidates' dependence on those do-
nations for the funds necessary to fuel their campaigns provide major
donors with opportunities for special access to elected officials. The
campaign finance system, thus, raises troubling questions about the
integrity of the government that makes and enforces our laws.
With the campaign finance system produced by the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Acte ("FECA") and Buckley on the verge of collapse,
what direction should campaign finance law take? One school of
thought, championed by Justice Clarence Thomas and a diverse and
growing group of legal scholars,5 would say "go back," that is, deregu-
late. They would scrap FECA's prohibitions, restrictions, and contri-
bution limitations, and preserve only some reporting and disclosure
requirements. Deregulation would certainly have some benefits. It
would eliminate the evasions, the end-run tactics, and the fine legal
distinctions that make a mockery of the current campaign finance
laws. By enabling candidates to obtain large contributions directly
from wealthy individuals, deregulation would also ameliorate the bur-
dens of the fundraising process, if only for those candidates favored by
wealthy donors. Deregulation, however, would do nothing to pro-
mote competitive election contests; it would preserve, if not expand,
the influence of large donors on election campaigns; and it would ef-
fectively ratify the influence of large donations over the political proc-
ess.
A second approach, epitomized by the Shays-Meehan Bipartisan
Campaign Reform bill which has now twice passed the House of Rep-
6resentatives, would attempt to renew FECA by using the traditional
techniques of contribution restrictions and disclosure to plug the
holes created by soft money and so-called issue advocacy expendi-
3 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455.
' See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
518 U.S. 604, 641-44 (1996) (ThomasJ, concurring injudgment, dissenting in part).
See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE LJ. 1049 (1996) (arguing that campaign finance is
undemocratic);Joel M. Gora, Campaign Finance Reform: Still Searching Today for a Better
Way, 6J.L. & PoLY 137 (1997) (arguing against any restrictions on the use of cam-
paign money); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Ft-
nance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1705 (1999) (arguing that current campaign finance re-
forms may make politics less accountable to democratic control); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311 (1998) (proposing First
Amendment reasons to deregulate contributions).
6 Shays-Meehan Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 417, 106th Cong.
(1999).
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tures. Such a reform might be able to check special interest influ-
ence, but it would do nothing to provide challengers with the re-
sources they need to conduct competitive campaigns and do little to
promote political equality within the electoral process.7
A third approach is to go forward, build on the presidential public
funding law and the growing experience with public funding in many
states and localities, and create a system in which public funds are
available for candidates for all federal elective offices. Public funding
would do a better job than purely private funding in promoting com-
petitive elections, mitigating the impact of inequalities of wealth on
the electoral process, and reducing the influence of large campaign
contributors on government. Better than reforms which are based
solely on restricting campaign spending and are thereby subject to at-
tack as limits on political speech, public funding provides new re-
sources for electoral communications and, thus, actually promotes
8First Amendment values. Public funding would also ameliorate the
burden of fundraising that presses so hard on contemporary candi-
dates.9 Public funding is not a panacea for all the ills of our political
life. Nevertheless, public funding would make the financing of elec-
tion campaigns more consistent with our political values, and it would
enhance the ability of elections to serve their crucial role in our sys-
tem of democratic self-governance.
Part I provides a brief description of public funding. Part II
makes a case for public funding in terms of the basic principles of
democratic elections. Part III considers the most serious objection to
public funding-that, whatever its appeal in theory, it is not workable
in practice. Given the tight space restrictions that apply to these
paired Articles, and the editors' desire that they focus on the basic
7 Extending regulation to soft money and issue advocacy would also raise serious
constitutional questions. Compare Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Con-
stitutional Prohibition on a Soft Money Ban, 24J. LEGIS. 179 (1998) (banning most forms
of soft money would be unconstitutional), with Daniel M. Yarmish, Note, The Constitu-
tional Basis for a Ban on Soft Money, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1257 (1998) (banning soft
money is constitutional). See also Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elec-
tions/Politics Line, 77 11x. L. REV. 1751, 1777-80 (1999) (discussing constitutional val-
ues implicated by the regulation of so-called issue advocacy expenditures).
a Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that public funding is a constitutionally
valid mode of campaign finance reform. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85-108
(1976).
9 On the significance of the burdens of fundraising in appraising a campaign fi-
nance system, see Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Irolate the First Amendment AfterAll, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1281 (1994).
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principles at stake, I am not going to present a specific plan. Instead,
I will suggest that public funding can be made to work if we take seri-
ously the lessons from our experience with public funding so far, par-
ticularly the need to provide candidates with sufficient resources for
their campaigns and to design a system that minimizes the regulatory
burdens for participating candidates and enforcement agencies.
I. PUBLIC FUNDING: IN BRIEF
As Professor Smith notes, "public financing" is a term with poten-
tially multiple meanings.10 It could encompass the abuse of the frank-
ing privilege by incumbent officeholders, tax breaks for donations to
campaigns, requirements that broadcasters provide free air time to
election candidates, or grants of public funds to candidates or politi-
cal parties. By public funding, I mean a campaign finance system in
which candidates or political parties receive cash grants for campaign
purposes from the public treasury.1
Although the dominant form of campaign finance in the United
States is private funding-that is, the money for campaigns comes
from private donors, such as individuals, private organizations, or the
candidates themselves-public funding in the form of cash grants to
candidates or parties has been used in presidential elections since
1976, and there are currently public funding systems in at least two
dozen states and cities around the country. In these systems candi-
dates qualify either by raising a threshold amount of money from a
requisite minimum of donors, or by winning a party nomination.
Candidates then receive either matching grants that reflect their abil-
ity to obtain small private donations, or, in the case of the presidential
nominees, flat grants that are based on the electoral strength of the
parties that nominated them. Most of these systems are quite limited
in scale, either covering just a handful of offices-a number of state
10 See Bradley A. Smith, Some Problems with Taxpayer-Funded Political Campaigns, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592 (1999).
" A number of academics have proposed public funding plans in which the gov-
ernment would give vouchers to voters who could then use them to make political do-
nations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign
Finance, 13 AM. PROSPEcT 71 (1993) (proposing that vouchers issued to voters would
be the only money that could be used in political campaigns); Richard L. Hasen, Clip-
ping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance
Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996) (proposing that voters receive vouchers that could
be contributed to candidates or interest groups as their exclusive funding source for
federal election campaigns).
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systems fund elections for governor only-or providing only a small
fraction of the funds needed to finance a campaign. Public funding
is also widely used in foreign democracies, although in those countries
funds are usually provided to political parties rather than candidates.
But public funding has supplied a significant portion of the funds
available to candidates in the last six presidential elections, to candi-
dates for both statewide and legislative office in Minnesota and Wis-
consin, and to both executive and legislative candidates in New York
City and Los Angeles. In the 1996 and 1998 elections, referendum
voters in Arizona, Maine, and Massachusetts approved ballot proposi-
tions which would make most elections in those states substantially fi-
nanced by publicly provided dollars. 4
Although there are many fully privately funded systems-such as
the system for the election of members of Congress-there are not
and probably cannot be any fully publicly funded systems. No candi-
date can be prohibited from using private funds, so a publicly funded
candidate may have a privately funded opponent. Even if all candi-
dates in a particular race do accept public funds, noncandidates-
such as individuals, political committees, or others interested in the
outcome of the election-are free to use private funds for election-
related spending. Even candidates who receive public funds are un-
likely to be fully publicly funded. As noted, most public funding sys-
tems require candidates to raise a threshold amount of private funds
to begin with, and then use matching formulas to link the amount of
public money a candidate receives to his or her ability to raise private
funds. Public funding, thus, involves supplementing, not supplanting,
the private funding system.15
1 See generally MICHAELj. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM:
SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 51-75 (1998) (re-
viewing details of state public funding systems).
'3 See CoMPARATIVE PoInCAL FINANE AMONG THE DFMOCRACIES 29-40, 97-144
(Herbert E. Alexander & Rei Shiratori eds., 1994) (collecting essays reviewing experi-
ences with public funding in Australia, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the for-
mer West Germany).
'" The Arizona, Maine, and Massachusetts voter-initiated measures adopted so-
called "clean elections acts." The Arizona measure, adopted in November 1998, is
codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-940 to -961 (West 1999). The Maine measure,
adopted in 1996, applies to state election campaigns beginning in 1999. See ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, §§ 1121-1128 (West 1998). The Massachusetts Clean Elections Act,
adopted in 1998, applies to state executive and legislative elections starting with the
2002 election. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55A (Law Co-op. 1998) (creating public fund-
ing system and setting spending limits).
'5 The so-called "clean money" campaign finance reforms recently adopted by
voter initiatives in Arizona, Maine, and Massachusetts do attempt to fully publicly fund
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All existing systems for providing public funds to candidates re-
quire those who accept public funds to agree to accept limits on their
campaign spending. For many critics of the existing campaign fi-
nance system, spending limits are part of the appeal of public fund-
ing. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, public funding is essential
for spending limits. But spending limits are not essential to public
funding, and many of the benefits of public funding in promoting
competitive elections and reducing the role of private wealth could be
secured without spending limits.16 Nevertheless, public funding is in
practice intertwined with spending limits. Any public funding plan
likely to be adopted is also likely to provide for spending limits. So
the case for public funding ought to assume that public funding will
be conditioned on the acceptance of spending limits.
II. PUBLIC FUNDING AND THE BASIC PRINCIPLES
OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS
Public funding is more consistent than either the current FECA
system, a deregulated system, or the FECA system with some loopholes
plugged by Shays-Meehan, with three basic principles of our demo-
cratic system: that elections be open, fair, informed, and vigorously
contested; that all adult citizens have equal opportunity to influence
the electoral process; and that the purpose of our elections is to elect
a representative government that pursues the public interest when it
makes and enforces the laws that bind the polity.
A. Competitive Elections
Elections are about giving voters choices. A fair election is one in
which voters are able to choose among a number of contenders for
the same position, and in which the competing contenders are able to
make their cases to the voters. Two factors can limit the ability of
candidates to compete: legal constraints, such as restrictions on the
participating candidates, but even these systems cannot compel candidates to partici-
pate or limit campaign spending by noncandidates.
'6 Spending limits pose complex questions. They promote spending parity and
ameliorate the "arms race" mentality among candidates. With limits in place, a candi-
date knows how much her opponent can raise and spend, and that can reduce the
candidate's own need to devote time and effort to fundraising. On the other hand,
spending limits raise the danger that the limits will be set too low, and thus cripple the
ability of challengers to offset the superior name recognition that incumbents enjoy.
Spending limits can also interfere with the ability of a candidate to respond to late-
breaking developments, create incentives for evasion, and require additional public
resources for enforcement.
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amount or type of campaigning, and resource constraints, that is,
whether candidates have the funds to pay the costs of campaigning. If
one candidate is well-funded, but her opponents lack resources, the
voters are likely to hear far more information and arguments from the
first candidate than from the others. If, in a campaign marked by
grossly unequal resources or by the inability of some candidates to
raise enough money to effectively communicate with the electorate,
the big spender wins, that casts a shadow over the fairness of the con-
test and the legitimacy of the outcome.
The concern about fair competition is particularly focused on the
ability to challenge incumbents. As Joseph Schumpeter noted, "elec-
torates normally do not control their political leaders in any way ex-
cept by refusing to reelect them."17 Elections are not simply about giv-
ing voters the power to determine who holds public office. The
opportunity to oust officeholders from office, and the possibility that
in any given election, the people may exercise that authority, is the ul-
timate security of popular control over government. The value of fair
electoral competition is, therefore, especially significant when the in-
cumbent officeholder is seeking reelection. The incumbent typically
starts with many built-in advantages, ranging from the free media at-
tention he gets during his term in office, to the opportunity to use the
office to provide constituency service, to the fact that the incumbent
was popular enough to win the last election. These advantages con-
tribute to, and are typically reinforced by, the incumbent's superior
ability to raise campaign money. An important goal for a campaign
finance system is to assure that challengers have sufficient funds to
mount effective challenges to incumbent officeholders. This will
make it more likely that incumbents will actually be challenged, and
that the incumbent-challenger election is a real contest.
Funding parity is not essential for fair elections. Challengers can
18do well so long as they have a critical mass of funds. Nor is it neces-
sary for challengers actually to defeat incumbents or for there to be
frequent turnovers in office. Rather, voters need to know they have a
real alternative to the incumbent, and incumbents need to know there
is a real possibility they may lose. This requires credible challengers,
and credible challengers require adequate financing.
, JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPrTAISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 272 (3d ed.
1950)." See GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECrIONS 136-62 (1980)
(noting that the sufficiency of challenger spending is the critical variable in determin-
ing whether an election is competitive).
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A great weakness of our private campaign finance system is its
failure to provide challengers with adequate funding. According to a
recent study of congressional elections by the Committee for Eco-
nomic Development, "[tihe majority of House challengers now raise
and spend so little that they cannot wage a viable campaign."' 9 In
1998, the average House incumbent spent $657,000 and the average
House challenger spent $265,000, or just 40% of what the average in-
cumbent spent. More importantly, approximately half of all House
challengers raised less than $100,000, and only one-third raised as
much as $200,000. As a result, "most House elections were financially
uncompetitive."20 Indeed, 60% of House incumbents "either had no
significant opposition or outspent their opponents by a margin of ten
to one or more."
21
If an election is financially uncompetitive, it is usually politically
uncompetitive too. The House challengers who spent less than
$200,000 generally received less than 40% of the two-party vote.'
Conversely, politically competitive elections are marked by financially
competitive challengers. The relatively small number of House chal-
lengers who managed to obtain as much as 40% of the major party
vote spent an average of $639,000, or approximately the median level
of spending by all House incumbents.23 In the Senate, incumbent fi-
nancial dominance was less pronounced. Nevertheless, challengers,
on average, spent just two-thirds of what incumbents were able to
24spend .
In most races, it is not simply that incumbents in privately funded
elections have more financial resources than do challengers-they
have a lot more money. An incumbent can carry forward excess funds
'9 REsEARcH AND PoLIcY COMM., COMM. FOR EcON. DEV., INVESTING IN THE
PEOPLE'S BUSINESS: A BUSINESS PROPOSAL FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 17 (1999)
[hereinafter CED REPORT] (reporting electoral spending trends of House incumbents
and challengers).
20 Id. The challenger/incumbent spending ratio is comparably lopsided at the
state legislative level. In a survey of spending in the late 1980s and early 1990s, chal-
lengers spent less than 25% of what incumbents spent in a substantial majority of races
in California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. SeeWilliam E. Cassie & David A.
Breaux, Expenditures and Election Results, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN STATE LEGISLATIVE
ELECTIONS 99, 105 (Joel A. Gora & Gary F. Mancrief eds., 1998) (analyzing the rela-
tionship between incumbent and challenger spending in the 1992 election).
21 CED REPORT, supra note 19, at 17.
22 See id. at 17-18 (noting how uncompetitive underfunded challengers were).
See id. at 18 tbl.4 (reporting that the average expenditures by incumbents in 1998
was $657,000). These unusually well-financed challengers, however, faced incumbents
who spent an average of almost $1,000,000. See id. at 17.
24 See id. at 18 tbl.4.
1999] PUBLIC FUNDING AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS 571
from his last election, and is well-positioried to collect funds during
his term in office. The statistical likelihood that the incumbent will be
reelected increases his ability to collect funds from donors who want
to have "access" to the winner. Thus, incumbents usually start out well
ahead in the financial arms race. In contrast, the challenger usually
starts- out less well-known, and with less campaign money. Saddled
with the presumption of incumbent reelection, the challenger is likely
to experience greater difficulty raising funds throughout the cam-
paign. Political action committee ("PAC")contributions heavily favor
incumbents over challengers. Individual donors also tend to give
more to incumbents than to challengers, albeit their incumbent pref-
erence is less lopsided than that of PACs. Parties give more of their
money to promising challengers, but they tend to concentrate their
funds on a small number of close races and are unavailable to help
most challengers.2s The difficulty of raising money may not just limit
challenger finances, it may discourage challengers from participating
altogether, thereby limiting the range of choices available to voters.
As Frank Sorauf has noted, "the campaign finance system offers chal-
lengers no weapons with which to overcome the advantages of incum-
bency. The challengers lack money because incumbents' reelection
prospects are so strong as to discourage both the emergence of ap-
pealing challengers and the willingness of potential contributors to
invest in politics."
2 6
Public funding promotes electoral competitiveness. Challeng-
ers-and political newcomers in open seat races-are simply much
better able to mount campaigns when their privately raised funds are
supplemented by public funds. Indeed, public funding makes it
much more likely that there will be challengers in the first place, and
thus, that incumbents will be forced to defend their records and en-
gage in a public dialogue over their votes and policy preferences.
Public funding substantially contributed to the presidential campaigns
of Jimmy Carter in 1976, George Bush in 1980, Gary Hart in 1984,
Jesse Jackson in 1984 and 1988, and Pat Buchanan, Jerry Brown and
Bill Clinton in 1992.27 Public funding provided opportunities to chal-
lengers, political newcomers, and outsider candidates in the prima-
See MICHAELJ. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 138-58 (1998).
6 FRANKJ. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE 178 (1992).
See ANTHONY CORRADO, PAYING FOR PRESIDENTS: PUBLIC FINANCING IN
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 39-45 (1993) (reviewing the record of presidential public fund-
ing and noting that the "primary beneficiaries" are "the lesser known aspirants who
enter the presidential sweepstakes without a large base of donors").
572 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:563
ries, and offset the built-in edge of incumbents in the general elec-
tion. Indeed, in three of the five presidential elections conducted
with public funding that involved challenger-incumbent contests, the
challenger defeated the incumbent.
In New York City, which has run its last three mayoral elections
under public funding, challengers twice defeated incumbents. In
Minnesota, the only state that provides ample public funding for legis-
lative elections (and the only state with a high level of candidate par-
ticipation in the program), public funds have made legislative elec-
tions more competitive.28 Indeed, Minnesota is the rare state in which
virtually all incumbents actually had real challengers and, thus, con-
ducted state legislative elections that were real contests. In many
states that do not use public funding, half or more of all incumbents
ran unopposed.29
Minnesota is also the home of perhaps the most famous benefici-
ary of public funding,Jesse Ventura. Although outspent by his major
party opponents in the open-seat race for the Minnesota governorship
in 1998, public financing provided him with the money necessary for
his television ads and, thus, was essential to his success.3
Private funding systems-whether the current FECA system, FECA
enhanced by new restrictions, or deregulation accompanied by disclo-
sure-do nothing to promote financially and politically competitive
elections. Expenditure limitations without public funding would do
nothing to put funds into the campaigns of currently underfunded
candidates. New controls on party soft money might curtail special
interest influence but they could also make it harder for challengers
to raise sufficient funds since, as noted, the parties are the only major
source of campaign funds that devote a significant fraction of their
funds to challengers. Deregulation would certainly make it easier for
some candidates to obtain more funding, but it is unlikely to benefit
the challengers and political outsiders who are most disadvantaged by
2' See Patrick D. Donnay & Graham P. Ramsden, Public Financing of Legislative Elec-
tions: Lessons from Minnesota, 20 LEGAL. STUD. Q. 351 (1995) (finding that Minnesota
public funding system made state legislative elections more competitive even though
the system directed a disproportionate amount of public funds to incumbents).
29 See MALBIN & GAiS, supra note 25, at 137 (noting that in five states without public
funding between 21% and 58% of state legislative incumbents were in uncontested
races, while in Minnesota only 10% of incumbents ran unopposed).
-" See Conference, Life from the Ground Up: Local Lessons for National Reform,
27 FoRDHAm URB. LJ. 201, 234 (1999) (statement of Kathleen Czar, Executive Direc-
tor of the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor-Party) (attributing Ventura's success to
public financing).
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the current system. Incumbents currently garner the lion's share of
large contributions from individuals and political action committees.
There is no reason to think that would change if limits on contribu-
tions were removed. Most likely, in most elections the financial im-
balances would grow. Only public funding provides a mechanism to
promote financially and politically competitive elections.
B. VoterEquality
Voter equality is a central premise of our democratic system. Over
the course of our history, the electorate has been expanded to include
all adult citizens. Recent developments like the one person, one vote
doctrine3' and the vote dilution doctrine32 have sought to assure not
simply that each adult citizen has a right to vote, but that each voter
has an equally weighted vote, and, thus, an equal opportunity to affect
the outcome of the election. Our laws most emphatically deny a spe-
cial place for wealth in voting. Most states long ago scrapped wealth
or tax-payment requirements for voting, and the Supreme Court has
made the elimination of wealth and tax-payment tests a constitutional
mandate. Wealth may not be a criterion for the right to cast a vote3
or be a candidatem nor may the wealth of the voter be a factor in de-
termining how much weight a particular vote will be given.3
The role of voter equality in our electoral system has implications
beyond the actual casting and counting of ballots. For the election to
serve as a mechanism of democratic decision making, there must be a
considerable amount of election-related activity before balloting can
3' See, eg., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that state legislatures are
required to be apportioned on a one person, one vote basis); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964) (requiring congressional districts to be apportioned on a one person,
one vote basis).
S2 See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (finding that at-large voting sys-
tems may be used to dilute the voting strength of minorities); White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755 (1973) (finding that multimember districts can be used to dilute the voting
strength of minority groups).
'3 See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (invalidating law limiting
franchise in bond issue election to taxpayers); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (invalidating poll tax on grounds that wealth is "not germane" to
the right to vote).
' SeeLubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (invalidating law requiring candidate to
pay filing fee in order to have name placed on ballot); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972) (same).
See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (invalidating law requiring that bond issue
obtain approval of concurrent majorities of all voters and of tax-paying voters).
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occur. Candidates, parties, interest groups, and interested individuals
need to be able to attempt to persuade voters how to cast their ballots.
The election campaign is an integral part of the process of structured
choice and democratic deliberation that constitutes an election.
As a matter of legal doctrine, the Supreme Court has often de-
fined an election broadly to include pre-Election Day activities, or has
deferred to statutes that regulate pre-Election Day activities as part of
the electoral process. In Terry v. Adams, for example, the Court
treated private political activity that preceded an election, and infor-
mally but effectively supplanted that election, as a part of the elec-
36don. The Court has indicated that Congress can treat party nomi-
nating convention procedures as part of an election,7 and that
Congress can use the notion of a pre-election campaign season to de-
fine the obligations of broadcasterss8
Campaign finances are a critical part of the election campaign.
Money, in particular, is a unique campaign resource. "It buys goods,
and it also buys human energy, skills, and services.... [I] t is the
common denominator in the shaping of many of the factors compris-
ing political power because it buys what is or cannot be volunteered." 9
Money buys all the things crucial for a modem election campaign:
broadcast and radio air time; the printing and mailing of campaign
literature; transportation costs; the services of campaign professionals
for crafting the campaign message, conducting polls, and producing
campaign advertisements; the salaries of campaign workers; the rent
for campaign offices; the costs of data processing equipment and
345 U.S. 461, 466 (1953).
37 SeeMorse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S. 186, 218 n.31 (1996).
See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 368-88, 397 (1981).
S9 HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLTICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND
PoLTICAL REFORM 3 (4th ed. 1994). Even in the pre-primary phase of a presidential
election campaign:
Money buys things that can generate popular support. Money for example,
buys advertising in important markets.... Money buys chartered plane
flights, hotel rooms, food, balloons, and bunting, all of which are necessary
for the candidate to make speeches, shake hands, kiss babies, and milk cows
with great fanfare from state to state. Money pays for the salaries of campaign
staff and the facilities and materials necessary to establish a national organiza-
tion, which can then raise even more money. Money can also buy favorable
free media coverage. The amount of money the campaigns have raised in the
pre-delegate-selection period is one of the few concrete facts available to jour-
nalists to help them handicap the race.
David Dudenhoff & Ken Goldstein, Resources, Racehorses, and Rules: Nominations in the
1990s, in L. SANDYMAISEL, THE PARTIES RESPOND: CHANGES INAMERICAN PARTIES AND
CAMPAIGNS 183 (3d ed. 1998).
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computer time; even the expenses incurred in raising the funds nec-
essary to pay for the other campaign expenditures. These services are
unlikely to be provided by volunteers. They require money.
In a society that ranges from billionaires and multibillion dollar
corporations to the desperately poor, money is also far more unevenly
distributed than other campaign resources. This is illustrated by the
actual practice in our current system, in which a small number of
large donors currently play an enormous role. In the 1995-1996 elec-
tion cycle, large donors-that is, donors of $1000 or more-supplied
one-third of all the privately provided money in federal election cam-
paigns.4 0 These large donations were contributed by just 235,000 peo-
ple, or one-tenth of 1% of the total population. In 1998, individuals
who made donations of $500 or more accounted for 68% of all con-
tributions to Senate candidates and 56% of all contributions to candi-
dates for the House of Representatives.4' These figures probably un-
derstate the role of large donors since they count only donations
directly to candidates and not donations to political parties or political
action committees which, in turn, make donations to or expenditures
in support of candidates.
Large donors are not a politically or demographically representa-
tive sample of the general population. A recent study of large do-
nors-defined as those who gave only $200 or more to one or more
congressional candidates-found that the affluent, men, whites, and
people engaged in high-status occupations make up a far higher por-
tion of the large donor group than of society as a whole. Large do-
nors are also more conservative in political orientation and more Re-
publican in party affiliation than the general population.4
The reliance on private funding in a society marked by substantial
inequalities of wealth poses a sharp challenge to the principle of voter
equality. Those who make large campaign contributions have the op-
40 The balance of the approximately $2.2 billion spent in 1995-1996 was provided
by smaller donors, corporate and union treasury contributions to party soft money ac-
counts, and candidates' own funds. See Center for Responsive Politics, The Big Picture:
Where the Money Came from in the 1996 Elections (visited Oct. 27, 1999) <http://
www.opensecrets.org/pubs/bigpicture/default.htm>.
41 See CED REPORT, supra note 19, at 14-15 (noting the growth in the percentage of
money received from large contributors).
42 See Center for Responsive Politics, Individual Congressional Campaign Contributors:
Wealthy, Conservative and Reform-Minded (last modified June 9, 1998)
<http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/donors/donors.htm> (summarizing a compre-
hensive survey of individuals who donated at least $200 to a congressional campaign in
1996). The "reform-minded" in the title of the study refers to the contributors' views
on campaign finance regulation.
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portunity to have a much greater impact on the outcome of the elec-
tion than small donors and nondonors. Although elections are not
always won by the biggest spender, the big spender does win in the
vast majority of cases.43 Scholars have been unable to determine
whether the big spender wins because he is the big spender, or
whether the winner is the big spender because he is also usually the
biggest recipient of campaign contributions and the same factors that
lead voters to vote for a candidate independently lead donors to do-
nate to that candidate. Yet campaign spending surely has some im-
pact on most campaigns. Campaign finance reform critics tacitly ac-
knowledge this when they fault contribution and expenditure
limitations for imposing burdens on challengers." If, as deregulation
proponents charge, laws that restrict the ability of challengers to raise
and spend campaign funds impair the ability of challengers to win
votes, then campaign funds have an effect on election results.
Private funding, in effect, gives a large number of extra votes to a
small number of unrepresentative individuals. These votes are not
tabulated in the ballot result, but they play a role in the process of in-
fluencing how the ballots are cast. Private funding in a setting of ex-
tremely unequal levels of contributions-which reflect underlying dif-
ferences in the distribution of wealth-is in sharp tension with the
norm of voter equality.
Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged that voter equality is a
factor in appraising the campaign finance system. Although Buckley v.
Valeo emphatically and famously rejected the idea that equality can
justify limitations on campaign communications, the Court has relied
In 1998, the biggest spender won in 93.9% of Senate races and in 94.9% of
House of Representatives races. See Center for Responsive Politics, Money and Incum-
bency Win Big on Election Day (visited Sept. 15, 1999) <http://crp.org/pressreleases/
nov04_98.htm>. In a survey of legislative elections in 18 states over three election cy-
cles, in 11 of those 18 states, the bigger spender won more then 80% of the legislative
elections, and in four more states, the bigger spender won more than 70% of the elec-
tions. In every state, the bigger spender won more than 60% of legislative races. See
Cassie & Breaux, supra note 20, at 101-02 (showing that the bigger spenders won in
most of the elections in all the states surveyed).
44 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment
and Campaign inance Reform, 73 CAL L. REV. 1045, 1069-78 (1985) (arguing against
judicial deference to campaign finance reform legislation because incumbent legisla-
tors use the laws to protect themselves from challengers); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty As-
sumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE LJ. 1049,
1072-75 (1996) (arguing that contribution limits especially burden challengers); Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 685-86
(1997) (same).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) ("[T]he concept that government may
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on a concern about voter equality in validating federal and state re-
strictions on campaign expenditures by corporations. As Austin v.
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce explained, corporate campaign
spending can "unfairly influence elections" because a corporation's
campaign funds "have little or no correlation to the public's support
for [its] ideas."46 Prohibiting corporations from using their treasury
funds to finance campaign expenditures "ensures that expenditures
reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corpo-
rations." 47 In other words, campaign spending that reflects the corpo-
rate spender's wealth rather than the extent of popular support for its
message gives the corporate spender an undue influence on the elec-
toral outcome. That is the voter equality point in a nutshell. 8
To be sure, participation in and influence over an election cam-
paign are not the same as voting. 9 Voting is a discrete act. It is rela-
tively easy to measure votes and to assure that no person casts more
votes than any other. Participation and influence take many different
forms, vary widely in intensity, and are difficult to measure. It is virtu-
ally impossible to quantify the impact of a particular dollar in a par-
ticular race, nor would it be possible to quantify other modes of par-
ticipation and influence-the "free media" value of a celebrity
endorsement, the intensity of commitment of volunteers, the superior
organization of a particular interest group-that can affect a cam-
paign. It is not possible to truly equalize influence over elections. In-
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.").
46 Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); see
also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207
(1982) (upholding law intended "to ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth
amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization
should be not converted into political 'war chests'").
4 Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
The Court has sought to hold together its inconsistent views about the connec-
tion between voter equality and campaign finance regulation by asserting that corpora-
tions pose special problems because they enjoy a "unique state-conferred corporate
structure" which is said to give them special advantages in amassing funds. Id. at 659-
60. It is hard to see why this is relevant, or even that it is right. As Justice Scalia
pointed out in his Austin dissent, corporations are not alone in receiving special advan-
tages from the state. See id. at 680 (noting that other organizations receive government
support through contracts or tax subsidies).
49 Professor Bradley Smith is, of course, correct in noting that "[e ] lections are won
by counting ballots, rather than the aggregated wealth of the voters on each side."
Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86
GEo. L.J. 45, 97 (1997); see also Sullivan, supra note 44, at 672 (arguing that campaign
finance "more resembles political speech than voting"). But, as their attacks on con-
tribution and expenditure restrictions tacitly acknowledge, spending can influence
how ballots are cast. Seesupra note 44 and accompanying text.
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deed, given the value of robust and uninhibited political participation
and the extensive regulation it would take to assure total equality, as-
suring absolutely equal influence over elections is not even desirable.
Nevertheless, dramatically unequal campaign spending that reflects
underlying inequalities of wealth is in sharp tension with the one per-
son, one vote principle enshrined in our civic culture and our consti-
tutional law. Public funding is necessary to bring our campaign fi-
nance system more in line with our central value of political equality.
In privately funded systems, donors and independent spenders can
have a bigger impact on the election than those who neither contrib-
ute nor spend, and big donors and spenders can have a bigger impact
than smaller financial participants. Contribution and expenditure
caps could ameliorate this, but at the cost of cutting into the ability of
candidates to campaign effectively and possibly reinforcing the advan-
tages of incumbents. Public funding can break the tie between private
wealth and electoral influence while simultaneously supplementing
campaign resources. Money from the public fisc comes from every-
one and, thus, from no one in particular. No one gains influence over
the election through public funding. The more the funds for election
campaigns come from the public treasury, the more evenly is financial
influence over election outcomes spread across the populace.
Moreover, public funding promotes equality without limiting par-
ticipation. Resistance to treating voter equality as a campaign finance
norm has been sharpest when voter equality is used to justify the im-
position of limits on private campaign spending. Public funding,
however, increases voter equality while providing new funds for cam-
paign communications. This is clearly the case under the "floors
without ceilings" approach, in which candidates would be provided
with public funds without being required to accept a spending limit.?
But even where public funding is accompanied by spending limits,
public funding is unlikely to curtail electoral communications. A
candidate's acceptance of public funding with a spending limit must
be voluntary. Thus, each candidate has the opportunity to decide
whether, on balance, public funding with limits would help or hinder
her campaign and may opt in or out accordingly. Further, the avail-
ability of public funding for candidates has no effect on the ability of
other organizations to raise and spend money in connection with the
'0 For arguments for the "floors without ceilings" approach, see HERBERT E.
ALEXANDER & MoNIcA BAUER, FINANCING THE 1988 ELECTION 45, 138-89 (1991), and
Joel L. Fleishman & Pope McCorkle, Level-Up Rather than Level-Down: Toward a New
Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1J.L. & POL. 211 (1984).
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election independently of the candidates s' This limits the ability of
public funding to promote voter equality, but it assures that even with
spending limits public funding is unlikely to reduce campaign com-
munications.
C. The Impact of Campaign Finance on Government
We hold elections to select the officials who enact and execute our
laws. 2 The campaign finance system can have its own impact on the
behavior of government after, or, more accurately, between elections.
Where candidates depend on private contributions for their election
campaigns, the donors who provide the necessary support can have a
special relationship with elected officials. Large donors and prospec-
tive donors may be able to obtain special access to those officeholders,
and their views may carry extra weight in governmental decision mak-
ing.
Concern about the undue influence of large donors and prospec-
tive donors on the operations of government has been a driving force
in campaign finance regulation since the beginning of the twentieth
century. 3 The impact of the campaign finance system on the opera-
tions of government has been a central concern of the Supreme Court
as well. Buckley held that large campaign contributions may be limited
because they raise the danger of a "political quid pro quo from current
and potential office holders" to donors and potential donors, and that
such a relationship threatens "the integrity of our system of represen-
tative democracy.4
To be sure, political scientists who have studied the relationship
between campaign contributions and legislative behavior have
reached conflicting results concerning the extent to which campaign
51 See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a provision of presidential pub-
lic funding law that would have limited the expenditures of independent committees
with respect to the campaign of a presidential candidate who has accepted public
funding and spending limits).
52 See, e.g., SCHUMPETER, supra note 17, at 272 ("[T]he primary function of the
electorate [is] to produce a government.").
53 See, e.g., ROBERT E. MuTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING
OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 1-52 (1988) (discussing the history of campaign
finance regulation).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976); see also California Med. Ass'n v. Fed-
eral Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 197-98 (1981) (upholding limits on the amount
of money a person may contribute to a multicandidate political committee in order to
prevent circumvention of the limits on individual donations to candidates that were
sustained in Buckley).
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contributions actually affect legislative votes.ss There is, however, a
scholarly consensus that contributions do have an impact on voting
when "the issues under deliberation [tend] to be low-visibility, non-
partisan ones on which other voting cues [are] lacking."6 Such votes
"have very real results for particular special interests" and "constitute a
significant portion of what occurs on Capitol Hill."
57
The real impact of campaign donations appears to be far more
subtle than the direct exchange of contributions for the votes of
elected officials. Donors emphasize, and officeholders agree, that
what contributions produce is "access'--"the required entry ticket for
getting something done."- A large donor obtains a better opportu-
nity than a nondonor or a small donor to make her case to an elected
official. This may not affect a roll call vote on a highly publicized is-
sue, but it can have an impact on the thousand-and-one decisions that
determine whether and what exactly will be voted on: the precise
wording of a bill or an amendment; the decisions of a legislator when
a bill is being marked up in committee to move or withdraw an
amendment, or to accept or oppose a modification; whether to press
for one bill or amendment rather than another, especially when time
for action is drawing to a close; the voting procedure used in consid-
eration of the measure; or, simply, how vigorously to push or resist a
proposal. Without deciding how legislators vote, campaign contribu-
tions can affect what matters become law.59
"' See, e.g., DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE:
CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANcE REFORM 77-78 (1990) (reviewing and summariz-
ing the relevant literature).
'6 Id. at 78.
57 Id. at 79; see also SORAUF, supra note 26, at 170 ("IT]he influence of PAC contri-
butions tends to be strongest on the narrower, less visible issues before the Con-
gress.").
ELIZABETH DREW, PoLuTcs AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION 77
(1983); see also MAGLEBY& NELSON, supra note 55, at 79 ("[A]s nearly everyone agrees,
contributions ease access to congressional policymakers.").
59 The significance of non-roll call action is nicely illustrated by the successful ef-
fort of Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison to block the Department of the Interior from re-
quiring oil companies that drill on federal lands to pay royalties based on the market
price for oil rather than on the oil price the companies set for themselves. For four
years, Senator Hutchison blocked the Interior Department regulation not through a
measure subject to a Senate roll call vote, but by placing amendments and riders into
annual spending bills. "The Senate has never actually voted on Senator Hutchison's
measure. It has been inserted into must-pass spending bills that provide a perfect ve-
hicle for controversial measures that might attract public notice if they were openly
debated." Tim Weiner, Battle Waged in the Senate Over Royalties by Oil Yrms, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1999, at A20. Senator Hutchison has received $1.2 million in contributions
from oil companies in the past five years. See id.
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As Professor Sorauf notes, summarizing the literature on the im-
pact of campaign contributions, "the nature of influence in a legisla-
tive body involves much more than final roll-call votes" because "[t]he
kinds of policy refinements and strategic maneuvers crafted in com-
mittee may be important for specific interests even though they do
not involve great issues of policy."6 Such influence is likely to be diffi-
cult to detect, measure, or police. But political scientists who have
studied the legislative process believe it exists. Certainly, it is hard to
explain the hundreds of millions of dollars that organized interest
groups regularly pour into congressional campaigns unless such po-
litically sophisticated donors have good reason to believe they are get-
ting something for their money.
Some critics of campaign finance reform have questioned whether
there is anything troubling about that. In our pluralist political sys-
tem, we assume that interest groups will attempt to influence govern-
ment action, and that it is appropriate for government to respond to
such efforts. We do not expect our legislators to be pure Burkean
representatives, deciding matters based on an idealized sense of the
merits. 6' Nor do we expect our legislative process to be a "transparent
vehicle for plebiscitary democracy, for the transmission of polling data
into policy."62 Thus, if legislators may attend to the preferences of
their constituents, supporters, or party leaders, why is it problematic
for them to follow the wishes of their large donors?6
The short answer is that concern about the impact of campaign
donations on government derives not from academic theories of de-
mocracy, but from strongly held and deeply rooted popular beliefs.
From the enactment of the first Federal Corrupt Practices Act in 1910
until today, the American people have thought there is something
"corrupt" about the influence of large campaign donations. The
American public may not have a fully developed theory of democracy
that reconciles the conflicting imperatives of public interest decision
making and pluralist interest group representation. The popular
conception of democracy, however, is offended by legislative decision
SORAUF, supra note 26, at 168-70.
6, But cf. Sullivan, supra note 44, at 681-82 (suggesting that campaign finance re-
formers mightjustify restrictions on speech in the form of campaign contributions in
order to protect a Burkean detachment appropriate to legislators).
62 Id. at 681.
63 See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign 1nance Reform, 1995 U.
CRH. LEGAL F. 111, 115-16 (questioning why the personal gain a candidate receives
from a campaign contribution is any worse than the candidate's personal gain from
reelection or career advancement).
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making that is driven by the pursuit of campaign contributions.
Moreover, contribution-influenced decisions are inconsistent with
the value of deliberation that is central to our representative democ-
racy. Elected officials attentive to public opinion surveys, to the pref-
erences of groups that have supported them in the past, or to their
party's platform can acknowledge the competing influences over them
and "even deliberate publicly about how ... [these] can be recon-
ciled."64  But, as Professor Burke has suggested, "contributor-
influenced representatives are unlikely to be candid about the motiva-
tion for their actions; the last thing they want is an open examination
of the quality of their reasons and their process of deliberation."6
Professor Lowenstein makes a similar point when he contends that a
legislator might seek to justify a particular controversial vote by argu-
ing that the vote served the public interest, reflected majority senti-
ment in her district, or followed her party's line, but that the assertion
that a vote was justified because it served the interests of the legisla-
tor's principal contributors would be treated as "scandalous."6 Almost
certainly no legislator would ever advance such a justification for his
vote publicly.
67
The potential for undue influence over policy-making that results
from large campaign donations and from officeholders' dependence
on future donations for subsequent campaigns has long rankled the
voters. The uncertain relationship between campaign contributions
and the official actions of elected officials constantly generates ques-
tions about the motivations that drive government decision making.
The nexus between special interests and elected officials that results
from the predominant role of large private campaign contributions
undermines the very legitimacy of government action.
Public funding reduces the role of large private donors and, thus,
their potential for leverage over the decisions of elected officials. The
more campaign funds come from the public fisc, the less elected offi-
Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST.
COMMENTARY 127, 148 (1997).
65Id.
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption: Comments on
Strauss and Cain, 1995 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 163, 170-72.
67 This can be seen in the public response to the fundraising scandals that rocked
the Clinton-Gore campaign in 1996. When the public learned of the private meetings
between the President and large donors to the Democratic Party, there was a natural
apprehension that the President may have made certain decisions based on the do-
nors' interests rather than his own conception of the public interest. As Lowenstein
suggests, that was viewed as scandalous.
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cials need to be sensitive to the views of large private donors, and the
more they can act on their view of what the public interest requires.
There may be some debate over what exactly campaign contributions
buy, but whatever they buy, they will buy less of it when candidate de-
pendence on them is reduced by public campaign funds.
In short, public funding is superior to purely private funded elec-
tion campaigns-whether under FECA, FECA supplemented by con-
trols on soft money, or a deregulated system-in promoting the fun-
damental values of a democratic electoral system: competitive
elections, political equality, and government decision making in the
public interest. Only public funding offers the potential to make our
system more open and competitive by providing the resources neces-
sary to draw more candidates into legislative contests, and to enable
them to compete effectively. Public funding can reduce the time and
effort that all but independently wealthy candidates must currently
devote to fundraising, thus enabling candidates to focus more on the
voters and less on donors. Only public funding can reduce the disso-
nance inherent in a system that is nominally committed to political
equality but that grants an enormous role to a small number of large
donors in structuring our election campaigns. Only public funding
can reduce the role that campaign contributions play in providing
special interest groups with special access to and influence in the po-
litical process. Further, by relying on a mechanism that puts resources
in the hands of candidates, public funding promotes the free speech
values at the core of the First Amendment.
It has been suggested that public funding would inappropriately
involve government in the electoral process, but the conduct and con-
sequences of an election campaign are matters of great public con-
cern. Election results affect our entire society. Public funding in-
volves the use of tax dollars, but it is just as appropriate to use tax
dollars to cover the costs of an election campaign as it is to use tax
dollars to pay for preparing and producing ballots and collecting and
tabulating the results. The Supreme Court acknowledged this in Buck-
icy when it vindicated the use of public funding for presidential elec-
tions. Public funding, said the Court, is an effort "to use public
money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in
the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people. ' o
" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976).
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III. DESIGNING A WORKABLE PUBLIC FUNDING SYSTEM
The most serious objections to public funding are practical. It has
been argued that because incumbent legislators write the laws, pub-
lic funding-whatever the case for it in theory-will be pro-incumbent
in operation, impossible to administer, and as subject to evasion as the
campaign system created by FECA. These are important and legiti-
mate objections. The limited experience we have had with public
funding, however, suggests that these objections are overstated. Fur-
ther, the lessons of that experience can provide assistance in design-
ing a workable public funding system.
Public funding in practice has not demonstrated a pro-incumbent
bias. Certainly public funding has not been more pro-incumbent than
private funding. Challengers Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Bill
Clinton all defeated incumbents in publicly funded campaign systems.
It may be difficult to prove that any of these candidates won because
of public funding, but it certainly does not appear that they were
harmed. As I have already noted, public funding has contributed to
greater electoral competition in the two subnational jurisdictions-
Minnesota and New York City-in which it is widely used. Jesse
Ventura benefited enormously from public funding in his challenge
to the Republican and Democratic gubernatorial nominees in
Minnesota; candidate David Dinkins benefited from public funding in
his successful primary challenge to NewYork City Mayor Ed Koch; and
challenger Rudy Giuliani in turn benefited from public funding in his
successful campaign to oust incumbent Mayor Dinkins.
Moreover, so long as it is voluntary, challengers or outsider candi-
dates who believe they will be handicapped by spending restrictions
can always opt out. As presidential public funding demonstrates, vol-
untary public funding systems really are voluntary. Although there
was a very high rate of participation by the major candidates in the
first four publicly funded presidential elections, and possibly some po-
litical pressure to participate, those major candidates who saw them-
selves as better off outside the system-Ross Perot in 1992, Steve
Forbes in 1996, and Forbes and George W. Bush in their 2000 primary
campaigns-have demonstrated no compunctions about opting out.
It is difficult to conclude that the existence of public funding has
made these candidates worse off or hampered their campaigns.
0 The concern that incumbents will manipulate the terms of a public funding law
to protect themselves seems less relevant when, as is the case in several states, the pub-
lic funding law was adopted as a result of a voter initiative measure.
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In addition, legislatures do not write laws in a vacuum. Campaign
finance reform is a product of public concern about the existing sys-
tem, and campaign finance reform legislation reflects public demands
for change. The public, not incumbent legislators, has been the driv-
ing force behind reform. If public funding ever gets a serious place
on the congressional agenda, it will be due to extraordinary public
pressure. Such public pressure will play a role in shaping the terms of
the public funding law as well. Nor have the courts been reluctant to
strictly scrutinize and invalidate campaign finance legislation. Thus,
restrictions that unduly favor major party candidates or incumbents
will certainly be subjected to constitutional attack.
Can public funding work? Public funding requires administrators
to determine who qualifies for public funds, to disburse the funds,
and to enforce whatever restrictions accompany the funds. Can pub-
lic administrators handle thejob? In fact, administrators have success-
fully handled the qualification of candidates and disbursement of
public funds in presidential elections.70 The real question is whether
they can enforce the rules-particularly the spending limits-that are
likely to accompany public funding. The Federal Election Commis-
sion's enforcement record has been unimpressive. Penalties have
tended to be minimal and imposed, if at all, long after the election.
The New York City Campaign Finance Board, however, has demon-
strated that effective enforcement is possible during real time, that is,
during the election campaign itself.7 ' Public funding rules can be en-
forced if regulators are given the necessary funds and the legal
authority to do the job, and if the agency itself is structured to be in-
dependent and nonpartisan, rather than bipartisan. But enforcement
is a potentially serious Achilles' heel for any campaign finance reform.
If public funding is adopted, the administration of the system will re-
quire close public scrutiny n
70 One critical evaluation of the Federal Election Commission acknowledged that it
"has been more than competent in its handling of hundreds of millions of dollars in
subsidies to presidential candidates and political party nominating conventions."
BROOKSJACKSON, BROKEN PROMISE: WHYTHE FEDERALELECrION COMMIssIONFAILED
62 (1990).
'n SeeNEwYORKCUy CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., PARTYFAVORS (Jan. 1995) (reviewing an
incident in the 1993 mayoral campaign in which Board investigation led to the New
York State Democratic Party dropping its advertising campaign for the Democratic
Mayor, and to the Mayor's publicly funded campaign committee reimbursing the
Democratic Party for its expenses, thus keeping the program under the public funding
ceiling).
72 The best study of the shortcomings of campaign finance law enforcement is
MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 25.
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Beyond the question of outright rules violations are the issues of
rules evasion and system avoidance. At the presidential level, the
spending limits accompanying public funding have been effectively
nullified by soft money and issue advocacy. The decisions of Republi-
can candidates George W. Bush and Steve Forbes not to participate in
presidential primary public funding in 1999-2000 have further re-
duced the significance of public funding in the presidential cam-
paigns. Can it be said that public funding works if, notwithstanding
the availability of public funding, a growing number of major candi-
dates prefer to rely on private funds? This objection gets at an impor-
tant point. Public funding will not operate in a vacuum. It will have
to co-exist with private funding. Turning to private donors will re-
main an option for candidates, and large donors can find ways of par-
ticipating in campaigns even if the combination of public funding and
spending limits reduces the opportunity for direct donations to can-
didates. The drafters of a public funding plan will have to think care-
fully about the relationship between public funding and private fund-
ing. This relationship has implications for the resources provided to
the public funding system, the incentives for and restrictions imposed
on candidates as conditions for their participation in public funding,
and the enforcement responsibilities of administrators.
Resources are crucial. Presidential public funding is in trouble
because public funds are provided at inadequate levels. The general
election grant provided to the major party nominees in 1996 was
$61,900,000-or approximately what Richard Nixon spent on his re-
election campaign a quarter-century earlier. The public grant is
plainly insufficient given significantly increased campaign costs. The
combination of public funds and soft money in 1996 basically pro-
vided the major party candidates with the equivalent in inflation-
adjusted dollars of what their predecessors had in 1972. Candidates
began to cultivate soft money and to decline public funding when the
public grant became insufficient to fund an effective campaign. Pub-
lic funding can only work if funding levels are based on the costs of
competitive contemporary election campaigns.?
Similarly, both the attractiveness of public funding to candidates
and the ability of the system to advance its goals will be related to the
This is one of the problems with the clean money reforms adopted in Arizona,
Maine, and Massachusetts. They appear to set the public grant way too low. If that is
the case, then widespread evasion via soft money, issue advocacy, independent expen-
ditures, and other, not-yet-invented devices is sure to be the result.
1999] PUBLIC FUNDING AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS 587
level of the spending limit, if a spending limit is used. 7  To assure that
spending limits neither interfere with competitive elections nor dis-
courage competitive candidates from participating in the public fund-
ing program, "need" spending limits must be set at levels consistent
with the spending actually incurred in recent elections by competitive
candidates-defined, for example, as candidates who received 45% of
the vote-and then indexed to rise with inflation. Lower limits could
very well have the pro-incumbent bias that critics fear. Moreover, low
limits are likely to discourage participation, promote evasion, and in-
crease the burdens of enforcement75 Certainly, limits unnecessary to
7 Whether public funds should be provided by flat grant-like the presidential
general election funding of major party nominees, or like the "clean money" proposals
recently adopted in several states-or by matching funds is beyond the scope of this
Article. Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. Flat grants can be more
equalizing because they are not tied to a candidate's success in raising private dona-
tions. They are more likely to promote competitive elections because they place can-
didates on an equal footing. The flat grant can be made at the start of a campaign or
after a candidate has established eligibility to participate in the program, whereas
matching grants are paid over the course of the campaign. Early money is generally
more valuable to candidates, especially challengers. Moreover, one flat payment facili-
tates administration more than a system that requires a review of and a response to a
candidate's fundraising throughout the campaign period.
On the other hand, if all candidates actually received an equal grant, that would
raise the danger that public funding would artificially pump up weak candidates. As a
result, some flat grant systems, like the presidential general election system, tie the size
of the grant to the percentage of the vote won by the candidate's party in the last elec-
tion. That provides parity for the major party candidates, proportionally less to minor
party candidates, and nothing before the election to independents and candidates of
new parties. Moreover, such a flat grant system cannot work in the primaries. Match-
ing grants make more sense in primaries, and, by providing some reflection of the
candidate's current level of support, could benefit new parties and independents in
general elections. Matching grants may have the benefit of avoiding the twin evils of
pumping up weak candidates while failing to fund popular newcomers. Whatever the
nature of the payment system, the basic electoral value of fair and open competition
requires that public grants ought to be available to independents and new parties that
cross some threshold of support in the context of the current election. The provision
of the presidential general election public funding law that conditions eligibility for
public funding (and notjust the amount of public support) on performance in a prior
election unfairly burdens new parties.
The significance of the level of the spending limit for candidate participation in
a public funding plan is best illustrated by Wisconsin's experience. In 1986, the public
funding spending limits, which had initially been indexed to the rate of inflation, were
frozen. Thereafter, according to the Governor's Blue-Ribbon Commission on Cam-
paign Finance Reform, participation in the program began to drop. By 1996, the par-
ticipation rate was much below that of neighboring Minnesota, which had indexed its
spending limit. In its 1997 Report, the Wisconsin Governor's Commission recom-
mended strengthening the state's public funding system by increasing both the
amount of funds provided to candidates and the level of the spending limit to take
into account the actual costs of campaigns. See 1 Governor Blue-Ribbon Commission on
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the broader goals of competitiveness, equality, and government integ-
rity should not be adopted.76
Dealing with the continued availability of private funding may re-
quire hard choices between encouraging participation in public fund-
ing and an administratively workable program. One set of issues in-
volves what to do when a candidate who accepts public funding with
spending limits is faced with an opponent who can spend above the
limits, or is the target of an independent spending campaign. Al-
though in some elections public funding alone would be enough to
make the candidate more competitive than she would have been had
she been forced to rely entirely on private funds, it may be necessary
to "avert a powerful disincentive for participation in [a] public financ-
ing scheme: namely a concern of being grossly outspent by a privately
financed opponent with no expenditure limit."7 Making public fund-
ing more attractive to potential participants by taking steps to offset
the impact of spending by nonparticipants above the spending limit
would promote public funding goals of reducing the role of large pri-
vate donors in campaigns, and, ultimately, in governance. But requir-
ing election officials to keep close track of the spending of candidates
and groups not participating in the public funding program and to
take action in the heat of a campaign could make public funding
more difficult to administer. It would certainly entail the commit-
ment of additional fiscal resources to the program, as well as the legal
authority to track contribution and spending by all participants in the
campaign process during the election.78
Campaign Finance Refom, Report of the Commission (visited Oct. 30, 1999)
<http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/reform/final.htm>.
76 The leading example of such an unnecessary regulation is the state-specific lim-
its the presidential public funding law applies to the primaries. These limits, which are
based on state population, fail to consider the strategic significance of relatively low
population states like Iowa and New Hampshire in the presidential nomination cam-
paign. The limits are frequently evaded, create unnecessary work for administrators,
and serve little purpose. See CORRADO, supra note 27, at 57-58 (noting that "candi-
dates who have wanted to [evade the limits] have found numerous ways to do so").
The FEC has liberalized them by rule and has sought their repeal. See FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION, THE PRESIDENTIAL PUBUC FUNDING PROGRAM 14 (1993).
Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1551 (8th Cir. 1996).
78 Providing that the campaign finance activities of nonparticipating candidates or
independent organizations can trigger benefits for the candidate participating in pub-
lic funding also raises constitutional questions. State public funding laws that release a
publicly funded candidate from the spending limit if a nonparticipating opponent
spends above the spending limit or receives contributions sufficient to pay for spend-
ing above the limit have been repeatedly upheld. See Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940
(6th Cir. 1998); Rosenstie4 101 F.3d at 1551; Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 928
(W.D. Ky. 1995). Simply releasing the publicly funded candidate from the spending
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Attention to resources and administration will be particularly im-
portant for the success of public funding after any public funding law
is enacted. The history of campaign finance regulation over the last
quarter century demonstrates that candidates and other campaign
participants have responded to new campaign laws in ways not fore-
seen by reform proponents. There will need to be a close review of
the law in operation and a willingness to make changes after seeing
how candidates and interest groups adapt to the law. Adoption of
public funding is a vital first step towards a campaign finance system
that is more in line with our basic political values, but it is only a first
step and its success will require ongoing monitoring and revision in
light of evolving campaign practices and evidence of how the law ac-
tually works.
Public funding of candidates' campaigns would be an important
reform, likely to be far more beneficial to our political process than
deregulation, curbs on soft money without the provision of public
funds to candidates, or simply staggering forward with the tattered
FECA system. But it is also important to recognize that public fund-
ing-or campaign finance reform generally-cannot by itself fully
achieve any of the goals that justify its adoption. Not just campaign
finance, but ballot access rules, the single-member district system, ger-
rymandering, and the territorially uneven distribution of voters of dif-
ferent partisan affiliations all affect the competitiveness of congres-
sional elections. So, too, the heavy concentration and frontloading of
the presidential primaries into a few weeks in the winter and early
spring of an election year makes it much more difficult to create a
level playing field. Nor can campaign finance reform assure that all
voters will have an equal impact on the election. Differences in inter-
est group organization, intensity of commitment, and interest in and
limit is also the administratively easiest benefit to provide. Going one step further, a
public funding law could provide the publicly funded candidate with additional public
funds when a nonpublicly funded opponent spends above the spending limit for pub-
licly funded candidates. See Gabe 142 F.3d at 949; Daggett v. Webster, No. 98-223-B-H,
1999 WL 1034520, at *1 (D. Me. Nov. 5, 1999). More constitutionally questionable,
and also more difficult to administer, would be making the action of an independent
group the trigger for an additional benefit to the publicly funded candidate. In Day v.
Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), the court invalidated a provision of Minnesota's
public funding law that would have provided publicly funded candidates a subsidy if an
independent group engages in expenditures against that candidate or for her oppo-
nent. In its very recent decision validating Maine's Clean Election Act, however, a fed-
eral district court in Maine rejected Day's approach and upheld the portion of the
Maine law that counts independent expenditures as part of the monies attributable to
a privately funded candidate in determining whether private spending would trigger
the provision of additional public funds. SeeDaggell, 1999 WL 1034520, at *7.
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time for political activity will remain and may grow more salient.
Some inequality in the electoral process reflecting differences in po-
litical engagement is probably inevitable. Nor can campaign reform
eliminate the role of money or of special interests in government
(even if that goal were wholly desirable). Interest group organization,
variations in concern with government action, differences in funds
available for lobbying, and other activities aimed at influencing legis-
lative and regulatory decision making will all continue to bear on gov-
ernment action.
Public funding is not a panacea whose adoption will usher in the
promised land of competitive and egalitarian elections and special-
interest-free government. Those who believe it will are bound to be
disappointed. But public funding would be an improvement over the
status quo. Public funding would make the electoral process more
competitive, even if not perfectly competitive. It would give voters,
regardless of wealth, a more equal influence over electoral outcomes,
even if not a perfectly equal influence. And by reducing officehold-
ers' dependence on large private donors, public funding would re-
move one source of special interest influence, a source particularly
tied to the wealth of the donors rather than to the size of organiza-
tional membership or the intensity of political commitment. With
adequate resources for candidates and for enforcement, and a com-
mitment to monitor and revise the law in light of future develop-
ments, public funding can work. Public funding would not produce a
perfect politics but it would be a real step towards a more democratic
politics.
